If you were around during this past summer's decentralized finance (DeFi) boom, you likely remember the countless “food forks.”<\/p>\n
After Yam Finance (YAM) launched in August, every project tried to copy it by making cryptocurrencies that were based on foods. The most famous of these Yam-inspired projects is SushiSwap<\/a>, which has become its own ecosystem since it launched in September.<\/p>\n There were many forks, though, that dropped rapidly.<\/p>\n One such fork was Grap Finance. Not Grape Finance, Grap Finance.<\/p>\n The project launched as a fork of Yam Finance, though expanded beyond this with non-fungible tokens (NFTs). These NFTs saw limited success, so GRAP fell in value over time.<\/p>\n But today, GRAP is up by over 5,000 percent as per CoinGecko data. But it is not because Grap released a revolutionary product, it is because the project's pseudonymous founder helped to patch or at least mitigate the hack of a Yearn-affiliated protocol.<\/p>\n Leading decentralized insurance provider Cover Protocol began to see a strong drop on Sunday evening.<\/p>\n The cryptocurrency, which reached as high as $950 on Sunday, began to plunge toward $700, then fell further and further.<\/p>\n It soon became apparent that something bad had happened. On-chain analysts quickly noticed that a small number of addresses were dumping COVER en-masse. The thing is, the COVER had come from 0x000…, a “burn” address through which Ethereum tokens are issued.<\/p>\n Many quickly ascertained that this meant there were users falsely minting, then selling COVER tokens, depressing the market price as there were too many coins in circulation.<\/p>\n Band Protocol<\/a> CTO Sorawit Suiryakarn broke down the exploit in the thread seen below.<\/p>\n He wrote that what had happened is users could deposit liquidity provider tokens into Cover's “Blacksmith” contract, withdraw almost all tokens from the contract, deposit tokens again, then claim the rewards pertaining to the deposits. This systematic approach purportedly caused a basically infinite amount of COVER to be minted.<\/p>\n Spent sometime looking into the recent exploit of @CoverProtocol<\/a> $COVER<\/a>. While not confirmed yet, here's my understanding of the attack in case someone is wondering. Hint: it involves using `storage` and `memory` incorrectly. <\/p>\n Small thread ?. Need someone to help verify. https:\/\/t.co\/PDFcT89slu<\/a><\/p>\n — Sorawit Suriyakarn | BAND ? ?? (@nomorebear) December 28, 2020<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\nGrap Finance deployer saves the day<\/h2>\n
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